

How We Use Recording Technology and Data

We view technology as a vital tool for public safety. To ensure it's used responsibly, we maintain rigorous privacy protocols and hold our officers to the highest standards of data integrity and professional conduct.

Body-worn Cameras

- Purpose:** Provide transparency and document interactions, protecting both the public and officers.
- Limits:** Strict activation requirements; recordings stored by state retention schedules are accessible for law enforcement purposes. They are also subject to public record requests under Arizona law and may be redacted to remove personally identifiable information.
- Safeguards:** Supervisory review and audit trails prevent misuse.

Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) Security Cameras

- Purpose:** Monitor public spaces and Town facilities for crime prevention and response.
- Limits:** Not used for mass surveillance or live monitoring of private activity.
- Safeguards:** Use is limited to specific public safety missions with oversight.

Drone Program (Unmanned Aerial Systems)

- Purpose:** Assist patrol and S.W.A.T., support search and rescue, document crash or crime scenes.
- Limits:** Flights require supervisory approval; not used for random surveillance of the public.
- Safeguards:** All flights are logged and reviewed; operators are trained and certified.

Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR)

- Purpose:** Locate stolen vehicles, support Amber Alerts and SAFE Alerts, and assist with criminal investigations.
- Limits:** Not used to track individuals' daily movements or for minor traffic infractions.
- Safeguards:** Data retention is strictly time-limited per Arizona retention policies; access requires a documented law enforcement purpose.

Understanding ALPR Technology

View a brief video overview as PV Police Chief Bob Ticer shares some important details regarding automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) and how this technology is used in the Prescott Valley community.



[Archived] What Are License Plate Readers and Why Do We Use Them?
Town of Prescott Valley, AZ (Official)



Watch on



there are many questions within our community regarding the use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology. At the

request of the *Prescott Times*, the Prescott Valley Police Department has compiled the following information to ensure every resident has access to the same factual, up-to-date data. We appreciate *The Prescott Times* for helping facilitate this important community conversation. (Posted 8/14/26)

We recognize that residents have legitimate questions about how this technology works, what information it collects, how it may be used, and what safeguards are in place. The responses below are based on the Department’s current ALPR policy, transparency information, and documented local examples.

To help navigate these topics, it is useful to distinguish between two categories of inquiry:

- **Operational Use:** How officers are authorized to utilize the technology in the field to enhance public safety.
- **Administrative Oversight:** The procurement, privacy policies, and governance processes that oversee the system’s implementation.

What is the primary purpose of ALPR cameras within your department?

Automated license plate readers, or ALPRs, are vehicle-focused investigative tools used for official law-enforcement and public-safety purposes.

Under current PVPD Policy 432, authorized uses include locating stolen vehicles and vehicles associated with wanted, missing, or endangered persons; supporting active criminal investigations and crime analysis; investigating serious criminal traffic activity such as impaired, aggressive, or reckless driving; and locating vehicles associated with critical incidents or threats to life.

The technology is intended to generate investigative leads. It is not authorized for generalized or speculative intelligence gathering.

Current PVPD deployment


PVPD Camera Deployment Totals by Location (as of September 2026)

- Installed standard/fixed LPR cameras: **29**
- Installed fixed video cameras: **8**
- Installed PTZ video cameras: **2**
- Installed AXON dash cam LPR in traffic vehicles: **2**

Active / Installed Cameras by Location

27 locations • 39 cameras

#	Location	Qty.	Camera type / device IDs
1	Black Canyon Hwy westbound toward Prescott	1	LPR: 1 (#10)
2	E Lakeshore Dr & N Badger Rd	1	LPR: 1 (#13)
3	E Lakeshore Dr & N Navajo Dr	2	LPR: 1 (F#005); Fixed video: 1 (C#015)
4	E Loos Dr & Katie Circle W	2	LPR: 1 (F#001); Fixed video: 1 (C#001)
5	E Loos Dr & N Robert Rd	2	LPR: 1 (F#006); Fixed video: 1 (C#002)
6	E Loos Dr & Preston Dr	2	LPR: 1 (F#007); Fixed video: 1 (C#003)
7	E Nace Ln & N Robert Rd	2	LPR: 1 (F#003); Fixed video: 1 (C#005)
8	E Nace Ln parking lot	2	LPR: 1 (F#002); Fixed video: 1 (C#004)



#	Location	Qty.	Camera type / device IDs
9	E Old Black Canyon Hwy & N Thimble Ln	1	LPR: 1 (F#051)
10	Glassford Hill Rd & Long Look Dr	4	Long-range LPR: 2 (LR#006, LR#005); Fixed video: 2 (C#026, C#028)
11	Glassford Hill Rd & Tuscany Way	1	LPR: 1 (#01)
12	Hwy 69 & Fain Rd	3	LPR: 3 (#22, #14, #16)
13	Hwy 69 & N Windsong Dr	1	LPR: 1 (#23)
14	Mountain Valley Park pavilion	1	PTZ video: 1 (C#017)
15	Mountain Valley Splash parking lot	1	PTZ video: 1 (C#016)
16	N Glassford Hill Rd & E Pav Way	1	LPR: 1 (#08)
17	N Glassford Hill Rd & Veterans Way	1	LPR: 1 (#09)
18	N Jasper Pkwy & E Copper Hill Dr	1	LPR: 1 (#19)
19	N Navajo Dr & E Valley Rd	1	LPR: 1 (#11)
20	N Robert Rd & Fain Rd	1	LPR: 1 (#07)
21	N Viewpoint Dr & E Addis Ave	1	LPR: 1 (#05)
22	N Viewpoint Dr & SR 89A	1	LPR: 1 (#03)
23	Prescott East Hwy & Frontage Rd	2	LPR: 2 (F#003, F#002)
24	SR 69 & E Baker St	1	LPR: 1 (#17)
25	SR 69 & Kachina Pl	1	LPR: 1 (#15)
26	SR 89A & Shiloh Rd	1	LPR: 1 (#18)
27	Spouse Dr & N Glassford Hill Rd	1	LPR: 1 (#12)

Can you provide examples or statistics showing how ALPRs have assisted local investigations?

Yes. PVPD has documented a number of local examples in which ALPR information assisted officers or investigators.

Examples include a shots-fired case in which ALPR identified a fleeing suspect vehicle and officers made a felony arrest; a case in which two women were pushed from a moving vehicle and ALPR helped locate the suspect vehicle; a threats and mental-health crisis in which ALPR helped officers locate the subject's vehicle; and a missing vulnerable adult with dementia whose vehicle was detected before he was later found safe.

Other documented examples include locating a person wanted on a manslaughter warrant, recovering stolen vehicles and property, locating a runaway juvenile in a stolen vehicle, and assisting in the recovery of a stolen dog.

As an example, the Department's supplied transparency data for a 30-day period may show something like this:

- 299,854 vehicle detections
- 216 user search sessions

- 1,638 hotlist hits
- 30-day standard retention

These numbers change on a daily basis. **Current data can be viewed at** <https://transparency.flocksafety.com/prescott-valley-az-pd>

A hotlist hit should not be confused with an arrest or confirmed criminal activity. Current policy requires officers, when safe and practicable, to visually verify the plate and confirm its current status through an authorized database before taking enforcement action. An ALPR alert is an investigative lead and may not, by itself, be treated as probable cause for an arrest or search.

We do not currently have a department-wide figure showing how many recent hotlist hits resulted in arrests or vehicle recoveries, so we would not characterize the 1,638 figure as an arrest statistic.

What information does our ALPR system collect—and what does it not collect?

The system is focused on vehicles and license plates.

It may collect a license plate image, vehicle image, vehicle characteristics such as color and make, license plate number and issuing state, date and time, and camera location.

PVPD describes ALPR as creating a searchable record of a license plate, vehicle description, time, and location when a vehicle passes a camera.

The Department's transparency information states that the ALPR system does not use facial recognition and does not identify race or gender. It is a vehicle-focused system, not a biometric identification system.

How long is the information retained?

PVPD's standard retention period for routine, non-hit ALPR detections is **no longer than 30 days**.

Plate reads not associated with an alert or case are automatically purged from the active ALPR system after that period.

Information associated with an alert, documented investigation, criminal-intelligence file, or criminal or civil action may be retained under the Department's normal records-retention requirements.

Any manual extension beyond the standard period must be documented with a case number, approving supervisor, and justification.

Who is authorized to search the system?

Access is limited to appropriately authorized and trained personnel.

No Department member may operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing Department-approved training covering system operation, legal restrictions, privacy and civil-rights considerations, historical-data use, data security, and Department policy.

The Criminal Investigations Division Lieutenant serves as the ALPR Program Coordinator and is responsible for system configuration, user access, hotlist management, compliance, training, data-sharing oversight, and audits.

User permissions follow the principle of least privilege and are reviewed at least annually.

Does an officer have to document a legitimate reason for each search, and are searches audited?

Yes.

Historical ALPR searches may be conducted only for legitimate law-enforcement or public-safety purposes. Personnel must document the reason for each query and any associated report or case number within the ALPR system.

Access to and analysis of stored ALPR data must also be based on a documented law-enforcement or public-safety purpose.

Current policy calls for ALPR audits at least annually. Those audits include review of user accounts and access levels, sampling historical queries for legitimate purposes, checking retention and purge settings, reviewing data-sharing settings, and documenting suspected misuse or security incidents.

PVPD has also enabled **Audit Assistance capability within Insights as an Organization Audit enhancement**. This provides an additional tool to support review of system activity, user access, query activity, and compliance. Audit Assistance supplements—not replaces—the Department's policy-required auditing responsibilities.

Can other law-enforcement agencies access or request PVPD's ALPR data?

Yes, but sharing is restricted.

Current Policy 432 allows ALPR information to be released to authorized and verified law-enforcement officials and agencies for legitimate law-enforcement purposes.

Routine or ongoing sharing with another agency or multi-jurisdictional repository must be documented through a written agreement or memorandum of understanding that addresses permitted uses, retention, secondary-sharing limitations, security requirements, and audit rights.

The ALPR Program Coordinator must maintain an up-to-date list of agencies with which PVPD shares ALPR data or from which it receives data.

PVPD ALPR data may **not** be shared for civil immigration enforcement.

Are there prohibited uses of the system?

Yes.

ALPR equipment and database records may not be used for unauthorized purposes or generalized or speculative intelligence gathering.

Policy also prohibits using ALPR to track individuals or groups based solely on race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, immigration status, gender, sexual orientation, or participation in First Amendment-protected activity. It may not be used for civil immigration enforcement.

Intentional misuse for personal, political, or other non-official reasons, or unauthorized disclosure of ALPR information, may result in discipline up to and including termination and, when appropriate, criminal investigation.

Can ALPRs be used for immigration enforcement, routine traffic enforcement, or monitoring people who are not suspected of a crime?

-Civil immigration enforcement

No.

Personnel may not conduct ALPR searches, create hotlist entries, or analyze ALPR information for the purpose of civil immigration enforcement. Outside-agency requests that appear intended for that purpose must be referred to the ALPR Program Coordinator and chain of command.

-Routine traffic enforcement

PVPD's transparency information states that ALPR is not used for minor traffic infractions.

Current policy does allow its use in investigations involving **criminal traffic activity that creates a danger to the public**, including impaired driving, aggressive driving, and reckless driving.

That is different from using ALPR as an automated system for routine traffic citations.

-Monitoring people who are not suspected of a crime

ALPR cameras passively scan license plates visible from public places, and current policy recognizes that this passive scanning does not require individualized reasonable suspicion.

However, access to and analysis of stored ALPR data must be based on a documented law-enforcement or public-safety purpose.

Historical searches likewise require a legitimate purpose and documentation of the reason for the query.

The system therefore cannot properly be used simply out of curiosity or for generalized monitoring of a person's lawful activities.

What would you say to residents concerned about future expansion or "mission creep"?

That is a legitimate concern with any government technology.

The safeguard should not simply be a promise that the system will be used appropriately. It should be a combination of written policy, access restrictions, documented searches, short retention, supervisory oversight, audits, transparency, and consequences for misuse.

Under current policy, ALPR deployments and searches must be tied to identified public-safety purposes, and generalized or speculative intelligence gathering is prohibited.

If the Department materially changes its authorized uses, retention practices, or data-sharing arrangements in the future, the public should expect transparency about those changes.

What oversight exists to prevent misuse?

There are several layers of oversight.

Access is limited to trained users. Accounts and permissions are managed under a least-privilege principle, searches must have legitimate purposes, and system activity is logged.

The Criminal Investigations Division Lieutenant serves as ALPR Program Coordinator and oversees access, compliance, training, data sharing, and audits.

Annual audits review user access, historical searches, retention and purge settings, data-sharing settings, and suspected misuse or security incidents.

PVPD has also enabled Audit Assistance capability within Insights as an Organization Audit enhancement. This provides an additional tool to support the Department's review of system activity, user access, query activity, and compliance with established policies. Audit Assistance supplements—not replaces—the Department's policy-required oversight and auditing responsibilities.

Intentional misuse may result in discipline up to and including termination and, when appropriate, criminal investigation.

Outside-agency sharing is also controlled through written agreements addressing permitted use, retention, secondary sharing, security, and audit requirements. Civil immigration enforcement is expressly prohibited.

Finally, officers must independently verify an ALPR alert before enforcement action. An automated hit is an investigative lead—not probable cause by itself.

What should the public understand about ALPRs that may be getting lost in the current discussion?

The most important distinction is between what the technology **detects** and what officers are **authorized to do with that information**.

ALPR records vehicle and license-plate information visible from public places. That information can help in cases involving stolen vehicles, violent crimes, wanted persons, missing or endangered people, serious criminal traffic offenses, and threats to life.

Because those detections are temporarily searchable, PVPD has established rules governing who can access the system, why searches may be conducted, how long routine data is retained, how information may be shared, and what happens if the system is misused.

Those safeguards include:

- Authorized law-enforcement and public-safety purposes
- Trained users
- Documented reasons for historical searches
- Individual user access controls
- Human verification of alerts
- 30-day retention for routine non-hit detections
- Restrictions on outside sharing

- Prohibition on civil immigration enforcement
- Annual audits and Audit Assistance
- Discipline, up to termination, for intentional misuse

An alert is not a finding of guilt or an arrest warrant. It is an investigative lead that must be verified.

Likewise, hundreds of thousands of vehicle detections do not mean hundreds of thousands of people were investigated. Passive detections occur when vehicles pass cameras in public view, while access to stored information requires a documented law-enforcement or public-safety purpose. Routine non-hit detections are then purged under the Department's retention policy. Residents should ask questions about technology used by their government. PVPD's responsibility is to explain what the technology does, how it contributes to public safety, what limits apply to its use, and what oversight exists to prevent misuse.

Additional Information:

Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR)

Real Time Operations Software (RTOS)

Explore the information below to learn how the systems work, how they integrate, and how privacy is protected.

Search

▼

Systems, Integration, and Privacy Information

- >

What These Systems Are and Are Not
-
- >

How The ALPR System Works
-
- >

How RTOS Supports Real-Time Response
-
- >

How ALPR, RTOS, and Town CCTV Work Together
-
- >

PVPD ALPR Case Examples
-
- >

Example RTOS incident: Disturbance at Prescott Valley Public Library
-
- >

Potential Concerns and How PVPD Addresses Them
-
- >

Privacy, Data Protection, and Misuse Prevention
-